Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2018

Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation: A Response to
William Baude
Hillel Y. Levin
Michael L. Wells, Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law Hillel Y. Levin, Alex W.
Smith Professor of Law & UGA Law in Atlanta Director University of Georgia School of Law,
hlevin@uga.edu

Michael Wells
Michael L. Wells, Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law Hillel Y. Levin, Alex W.
Smith Professor of Law & UGA Law in Atlanta Director University of Georgia School of Law,
mwells@uga.edu

University of Georgia School of Law
Research Paper Series
Paper No. 2018-09

Repository Citation
Hillel Y. Levin and Michael Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation: A Response to William
Baude , 9 Calif. L. Rev. Online 40 (2018),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1238

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have
benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Qualified Immunity and Statutory
Interpretation: A Response to William
Baude
Hillel Y. Levin* & Michael L. Wells**

Introduction...............................................................................................41
I. Statutory Interpretation as Applied to § 1983: Section 1983 is a
Common Law Statute ....................................................................43
A. Situating Baude’s Argument ..................................................43
B. Understanding the Characteristics and Justifications of
Common Law Statutes Through the Paradigmatic Example:
the Sherman Act.....................................................................45
C. Other Common Law Statutes .................................................48
1. The Lanham Act ..............................................................49
2. Contributory vs. Comparative Negligence Under
California Statutes ...........................................................49
D. Section 1983 is a Common Law Statute ................................51
II. The Difference Between What the Court Says and What It Does: The
Supreme Court Has Always Treated § 1983 as a Common Law
Statute ............................................................................................54
A. Areas in Which the Court Cites 1871 Tort Law ....................56
1. Absolute Immunity ..........................................................56
2. The Functional Approach ................................................58
3. The Convenient Congruence Between History and
Modern Constitutional Tort Policy ..................................61
B. Areas in Which the Court Does Not Cite 1871 Tort Law ......63
1. Qualified Immunity .........................................................63
2. Other § 1983 Issues .........................................................66
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38JH3D309
Copyright © 2018 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
* Alex W. Smith Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
** Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law, University of Georgia
School of Law.

40

2018] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

41

3. Congress’s Approval of the Common Law Method ........68
Conclusion ................................................................................................70

INTRODUCTION
Professor William Baude asks, “Is qualified immunity unlawful?”1 He
refers to the § 1983 defense, under which officers avoid liability for damages
unless they have violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”2 Baude concludes that qualified
immunity is unlawful because neither the text of the statute nor any valid rule of
statutory interpretation authorizes this defense.3 Under his preferred rules of
statutory interpretation, common law defenses would be allowed, but the
universe of defenses and other tort principles is limited to only those that were
available in 1871, which does not include modern qualified immunity.4 In other
words, according to Baude, if a given doctrine did not exist in 1871, it should
not be applied today. Thus, modern qualified immunity is “unlawful” because it
did not exist in 1871.
The implications of Baude’s argument are enormous. If the Supreme Court
accepts it, police officers and other officials who deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights could be subject to much more liability than the current law
permits. This could incentivize officials acting under the color of law to better
respect and protect individuals’ rights, which is more than the Court’s § 1983
doctrine currently encourages. As a policy matter, we are generally sympathetic
with this potential development because we tentatively agree with the critiques
that the current qualified immunity doctrine leads to far too many constitutional
abuses and must be adjusted. But as a matter of statutory interpretation, Baude
is off base, both normatively and descriptively. If his argument is only motivated
by his approach to statutory interpretation, we suggest that he is simply mistaken.
If his argument is also motivated by his policy preferences, then he is not merely
mistaken as a doctrinal matter; his argument also deprives him of the most direct
means of achieving the change he wants because it is highly unlikely that the
Court will reject in toto decades of precedent.
Section 1983 authorizes suits for damages against local governments, state
and local officials, and others who violate constitutional rights. The statute,
enacted by the 42nd Congress in 1871, provides that “[e]very person” who
violates constitutional rights “under color of” state law is subject to suit for
damages or injunctive relief.5 But it makes no mention of tort-like issues that
arise in these suits, such as causation, damages, and defenses. Consequently,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Baude, supra note 1, at 88.
See id. at 54–55.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (2012).
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courts must fill these gaps. Common sense suggests that this type of litigation
raises issues of statutory interpretation, specifically questions about what rules
of statutory interpretation should and do apply. Our fundamental disagreement
with Baude is rooted in our different answers to these questions and is
methodological rather than substantive. We take no position on the content of
actual or proposed constitutional tort rules, we do not object here to Baude’s
general approach to statutory interpretation, and we put aside any policy
preferences about official immunity. Rather, our issue is with Baude’s claims
about the sources the courts should and do look to when interpreting and
applying § 1983.
In support of his argument that qualified immunity is unlawful, Baude
advances two specific propositions that we challenge. One is his normative claim
that conventional rules of statutory interpretation should be used in adjudicating
issues raised in § 1983 litigation. We believe that his assertion is flatly wrong.
Section 1983 is better understood as a “common law statute,” to which different
rules apply. Baude acknowledges that such statutes exist and uses the Sherman
Act as an example.6 However, Baude errs when he distinguishes § 1983 from the
Sherman Act. If we are right, then Baude is mistaken in his argument that
defenses to § 1983 claims are to be understood only by reference to the common
law as it stood in 1871. Part I focuses on this normative issue.
Baude’s second assertion is harder to pin down. It is clear that he favors
treating 1871 tort doctrine as the controlling source of law and that he takes
seriously the Court’s statements supporting this approach to statutory
interpretation. When it comes to the typical modern statute, interpretation
begins—and often ends—with the text of the statute, its evident purposes, and
perhaps its legislative history.7 Indeed, plenty of statements in Supreme Court
opinions support the view of applying this modern approach to statutory
interpretation. For example, the Court has said that a § 1983 issue “is essentially
one of statutory construction,”8 that “[w]e do not have a license to establish
immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound
public policy,”9 and that “our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in

6. Baude, supra note 1, at 78.
7. Debates about the proper methods of statutory interpretation are extensive. See, e.g., Glen
Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 210–12 (2015)
(noting that the resurgence of debates surrounding statutory interpretation began in the late 20th century).
However, some commentators argue that different schools of statutory interpretation have become
increasingly similar, each following a similar process to the one described above. See, e.g., Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting that the differences
between textualism and purposivism have begun to fade); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists
from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75–76 (2006) (arguing that textualism and purposivism
share conceptual common ground with some competing justifications).
8. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 326 (1983) (noting that a § 1983 case “presents a question of statutory construction”).
9. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922–23 (1983).
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enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice.”10 Thus, some of the
Justices seem to believe, or at least claim to believe, that 1871 tort law determines
the answers to modern constitutional tort issues.11
But it is unclear how far Baude means to go as a descriptive matter in
claiming that the Court in fact follows 1871 tort law. At various places in his
article he seems to make different claims—that either the Court mainly follows
1871 tort law in deciding § 1983 cases or that it sometimes follows 1871 tort law
or that the better reasoned cases do follow 1871 tort law or that in the past,
before it took a wrong turn, the Court followed 1871 tort law. At the very least,
Baude assumes that the Court’s rhetoric about how to interpret § 1983 should be
taken at face value.
In whichever way the point is framed, Baude is wrong on this descriptive
claim. Whether the Court follows 1871 tort law is an empirical question that can
be answered by examining the Court’s practice, and the Court’s practice has been
to extol the importance of 1871 tort law while basing its holdings on modern
constitutional tort policy. Part II shows that, whether or not the 42nd Congress
meant for § 1983 to be treated as a common law statute, most of the case law
does this, emphatically including the Court’s cases on qualified immunity.
In short, questions concerning the “lawfulness” and contours of qualified
immunity doctrine should not and never have been answered simply by looking
to the common law as it stood in 1871.
I.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS APPLIED TO § 1983: SECTION 1983 IS A
COMMON LAW STATUTE
Professor Baude’s argument about the proper interpretation and application
of § 1983 is based on the premise that § 1983 is a “normal” statute to which the
normal rules of interpretation apply. In this Part, we explain the central flaw in
this argument: Section 1983 is a common law statute, so Professor Baude’s
normal rules do not apply.
A. Situating Baude’s Argument
Methodological disputes about the proper approach to interpreting and
applying statutes are legion. Textualists, purposivists, intentionalists,
pragmatists, what can be called living statutists of all stripes, and more have
filled untold pages of law review articles, books, and judicial opinions with fierce
and endless arguments about how to interpret and apply statutes that are unclear
10. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986); see also Tower, 467 U.S. at 922–23.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (the majority and principal dissenting opinions
both examine nineteenth century tort law on the standard for punitive damages, though Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion also considers modern tort law); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court should “shift the focus of [its] inquiry to whether
immunity existed at common law”).
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in difficult cases. Baude is a partisan of these debates, having written extensively
and thoughtfully in the field. He adopts a contestable but careful, defensible, and
mainly uncontroversial approach to interpreting statutes, one that lies mostly in
the originalist-textualist corner of the interpretive debates.
As an originalist, Baude believes that statutes’ meanings and proper
applications are generally fixed at the time of enactment. Leaning towards
textualism, he maintains that the text as it would most naturally have been
understood at the time of enactment controls on questions of statutory
interpretation. This stands in contrast to originalist-intentionalists, for example,
who believe that while the meaning of a statute is fixed at enactment, the actual
or recreated intent of the legislature is the primary interpretive touchstone.
Perhaps most different from Baude’s approach to statutory interpretation is that
of living statutists, who believe that the meaning and proper application of a
statute may change over time for a variety of reasons, many of which are still
debated today.
Baude’s general orientation in the field of statutory interpretation as an
originalist-textualist serves as the foundation of his argument that § 1983,
properly interpreted, does not allow for the modern doctrine of qualified
immunity.12 His argument proceeds logically from his originalist-textualist
priors: because § 1983 was enacted in 1871, any questions as to its meaning and
application should be resolved by consulting sources and assumptions present in
1871. Baude thus proposes looking exclusively to common law defenses and
their justifications to understand what unstated defenses should fill the gaps in
the text of § 1983. Finding the modern defense of qualified immunity to have no
meaningful parallel in the common law of 1871, Baude concludes that it has no
basis in the law.
There are three possible bases for disputing Baude’s argument on this point.
First and most broadly, one could argue that the originalist orientation is the
wrong frame for interpreting statutes. For the purposes of this article, we
maintain an agnostic stance on this point. That is, although we do not fully
endorse Baude’s views on this score, we will not take issue with his general
approach to statutory interpretation, and we assume arguendo that it is correct.
Second and most narrowly, one could argue that Baude’s historical analysis
is wrong and that the modern doctrine of qualified immunity has legitimate roots
in 1871 common law.13 Consequently, even those adopting Baude’s originalist
12. Like most originalists (textualists and intentionalists alike), Baude agrees that precedent
matters in at least some contexts, even where precedent departs from original meaning. In particular, in
considering the proper remedy for the Court’s errors in crafting the modern doctrine of qualified
immunity, Baude does not argue that the Court should simply discard decades of precedent. Rather, he
suggests that because of the impacts of precedents (wrongly decided in his opinion), the Court should
be less aggressive in doggedly policing, enforcing, and expanding qualified immunity doctrine than it
has been and perhaps roll it back slowly over time.
13. In fact, there is reason to believe that when the 42nd Congress enacted §1983 in 1871,
officers were typically protected from liability under common law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel
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approach to interpretation would find that § 1983 is compatible with the modern
doctrine writ large. We take no position on this point either.
Instead, we focus on a third problem with Baude’s analysis. Even if we
accept his general originalist approach to statutory interpretation, we suggest that
it simply does not apply—at least not without serious modification—to § 1983.
There is a class of statutes, known as common law statutes, to which even the
most committed originalists agree that the standard rules of statutory
interpretation do not apply—including rules that freeze the relevant sources in
the time of statutory enactment. Indeed, for example in antitrust law, which
offers a primary example of common law a statute, “courts do not even try to
find guidance in the relevant statutory texts and other textualism-approved
sources of meaning.”14
A common law statute is one that reflects “congressional recognition of the
continuing common law powers of courts to develop the law within a general
framework established by Congress and subject to intervention by Congress
where appropriate.”15 Unlike with “normal” statutes, when it comes to common
law statutes, many of the normal rules of statutory interpretation fall away:
textualism has no meaning, originalism is beside the point, judicial consideration
of relevant policy interests is welcome, the assumption that legislatures rather
than courts correct judicial errors through a bicameral legislative process is
rejected, and judicial precedents themselves are to be flexibly applied, updated,
or jettisoned as circumstances and developed wisdom warrant.
One may surely argue that this common law methodology is undesirable
and that the modern conception of legislative supremacy is normatively
preferable. But when it comes to common law statutes, this is how it works in
practice. Baude himself concedes that his approach to statutory interpretation
does not apply to common law statutes, but he also incorrectly assumes that §
1983 is not one of them. In fact, § 1983 is a prototypical common law statute.
B. Understanding the Characteristics and Justifications of Common Law
Statutes Through the Paradigmatic Example: the Sherman Act
There is no universally agreed-upon and readily-identifiable group of
common law statutes. However, there is broad consensus that such a class of
statutes exists, that statutes within this class share certain distinguishing
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1783–
84 (1991) (describing “the broad scope of official discretion generally recognized by the Supreme Court
during the early nineteenth century” and noting that “by the time of the Civil War, doctrines of discretion
and official immunity had blossomed into the precursors of modern doctrines of official immunity.”).
14. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common
Law Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 97 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
15. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes, in THE
COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID VAVER 331
(Bently, Ng & D’Agostino eds., 2010).

46

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9:41

characteristics, and that the normal rules of statutory interpretation do not apply
to statutes within the class. Unlike “normal” statutes, common law statutes
should not be interpreted solely as a product of the time of their enactment or
according to strict rules of statutory interpretation. Instead, they should be
viewed as delegations to courts to continue to develop the law and fill in statutory
gaps through the free-wheeling and policy-driven manner familiar from the
common law tradition.16
What qualifies a statute as a common law statute, and why are they treated
differently from normal statutes? Scholars and courts generally identify two
shared features of common law statutes, each of which suggests complementary
justifications for treating them differently from “normal” statutes: (1) common
law statutes are written broadly, in “sweeping, general terms,”17 and (2) they are
enacted against a rich common law tradition that they incorporate.18 To these we
add a third defining feature: They are old.
The prototypical common law statute, the landmark Sherman Act of 1890,19
reflects each of these features. First, it is written in “sweeping, general terms”.20
Indeed, the primary substantive provision of the Sherman Act baldly declares
that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”21 This simple phrase begs
interpretation and gap-filling, yet none of the operative terms was defined or
cabined in the Act’s original text.
Read literally, this sweeping provision could outlaw every private
contract.22 Given the implausibility of such a reading, courts have “long held that
the operative question is whether the conduct at issue restrained trade
unreasonably.”23 Adding in this “reasonableness” provision is itself an act of
judicial policymaking, for it appears nowhere in the text. More to the point, this

16. Lemos, supra note 14, at 91; see also William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1052 (1989) (“The Court’s invocation of common law
principles to fill in gaps within fairly detailed statutes such as FELA is a regular occurrence, but the
meta-rule is even more critical for several older, generally worded federal statutes that Congress has
substantially left to the courts to develop. These ‘common law statutes’ include Section 1983 and several
of the other civil rights measures enacted after the Civil War, the Sherman Act of 1890, the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws, and Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.”).
17. Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
18. Id.
19. Lemos, supra note 14, at 89; see also Guardians Assoc., 463 U.S. at 642 n.12 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms, expecting the federal
courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-case basis in the common law tradition.
One clear example of such a statute is the Sherman Act.”).
20. Guardians Assoc., 463 U.S. at 642 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
22. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[R]ead literally, §
1 would outlaw the entire body of private contract law.”).
23. Lemos, supra note 14, at 92.
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standard “plainly invites [yet further] judicial policymaking,” since it demands
“elaboration to clarify its contents”—with none of that elaboration coming from
the text of the statute itself.24
Based on the sweeping and general nature of common law statutes, judges
and scholars maintain that they are to be treated differently from “normal”
statutes because they are written so broadly that courts must fill in the gaps. This
justification can be framed either pragmatically or through a process of
originalist interpretation. From a purely pragmatic standpoint, even putting aside
what a common law statute’s drafters may have intended or understood, judicial
policymaking in the common law style is necessary because in the absence of
further legislative guidance, there is simply no other option than for courts to fill
in the gaps.
Alternatively, from an originalist perspective, the theory is that the
legislature must have meant for courts to have ultimate authority to continue to
develop and adapt the statute over time. Otherwise, they would have provided
specific guidance for judges to use in interpreting and developing the statute. For
this reason, some scholars have noted a close parallel between common law
statutes and enabling statutes that delegate interpretive powers to agencies,
suggesting that both are required due to an act of legislative volition—the
affirmative choice to delegate policymaking authority.25 As one leading antitrust
scholar explains, as a common law statute, “the Sherman Act can be regarded as
‘enabling’ legislation—an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses
and markets work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in
socially efficient ways.”26 As such, it and other common law statutes, like
enabling legislation, leave substantially greater space for judges to develop the
law than do “normal” statutes.
Common law statutes share the second characteristic that they are enacted
against a common law tradition. This is also typified by the Sherman Act because
it was written against and implicitly incorporated the rich background of
common law antitrust doctrine as it stood at the time. That is, the Sherman Act
was not the first source of law to outlaw monopolistic and unfair trade practices,
but most of the earlier sources of law were not legislative. Instead, they were
found in the pages of judicial opinions. Although the Sherman Act adopted these
doctrines, rather than reify them in time, it implicitly empowered judges to
continue to develop through the common law process.
Justice Scalia, the celebrated avatar of originalist-textualism on the
Supreme Court and thus not one to look favorably on loose judicial interpretation

24.
25.
26.
1985).

Id.
Id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 52 (student ed.

48

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9:41

of statutory texts,27 touched on this characteristic of common law statutes in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.28 Writing for the Court,
he explained that the Sherman Act “adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along
with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the
static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”29 In other
words, the term “restraint of trade” has a common law meaning, and its common
law roots and the process of its elaboration traveled with the term when it became
statutorified.
This characteristic of common law statutes suggests another normative
justification for treating them differently from “normal” statutes. Judges have
expertise in the substance of the common law and in the process of its
development. Delegating to them the authority to define, apply, and further
develop a body of law that has long and thick roots in the corpus of common law
may therefore make good sense and may in fact reflect the actual intent of the
legislators who enacted such statutes.
The third descriptive characteristic of common law statutes is that they are
old. Most common law statutes, like the Sherman Act, date to the nineteenth
century. Others date to the first half of the twentieth century. This characteristic
is not wholly independent of the other two previously mentioned characteristics.
More modern statutes are rarely written in broad strokes; instead they are highly
detailed. And they do not typically build directly on common law but rather upon
prior statutory law. This reflects the more modern trend in American lawmaking,
which has moved us away from our common law tradition through what one
commentator has called an “orgy of statute making.”30 Judicial and scholarly
pronouncements that propose to demarcate a strict line between legislative
policymaking and judicial interpretation are a byproduct of the trend away from
common law development of the law and toward statutorification. In the age of
common law statutes, that line was hardly clear. This suggests that legislators
themselves did not intend or understand that putting something into a statute
would result in disempowering the courts from gap-filling and elaborating on the
law in the common law tradition.
C. Other Common Law Statutes
The Sherman Act may be the most well-known common law statute, but it
is hardly the only one. In this section, we briefly review two others that further
exemplify the shared characteristics of common law statutes and identify some
additional features.

27. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 857 (1990) (“A rule
of law . . . has thus been transformed into a rule of discretion, giving judges power to expand or contract
the effect of legislative action. We should turn this frog back to a prince as soon as possible.”).
28. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
29. Id. at 732.
30. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
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1. The Lanham Act
Like the Sherman Act, the foundational trademark law statute, the Lanham
Act,31 has all of the features of a common law statute.
First, Congress wrote the Lanham Act’s substantive provisions32 in broad
and general terms, consisting of a few vague phrases: “‘exclusive right to use,’
‘use which is likely to cause confusion,’ and ‘false designation of origin.’”33
Second, courts, rather than the legislature, created and refined trademark law;
the Lanham Act merely incorporates these common law rules as if by
hyperlink.34 Thus, the brief, general substantive provisions in the Act simply
adopt “the complete common law development” and incorporate “the complex
body of rules developed by common law courts over several centuries.”35
Further, the Lanham Act, which Congress enacted in 1946, is old. To be
sure, the Lanham Act is of more recent vintage than most common law statutes,
which date to the nineteenth century. Its passage, however, predates the modern
obsession with statutorification and the strict dichotomy between legislative and
judicial policymaking.
Moreover, the degree to which the Lanham Act so clearly incorporates the
pre-existing body of common law and delegates to judges the power and
responsibility to continue to develop the law are evidence of congressional
understanding or intent. Indeed, the Lanham Act includes an explicit provision
delegating the power to develop the law to courts.36 Nineteenth-century common
law statutes may not have required such a provision precisely because the
predominance of common law at the time made courts natural policymakers. By
the middle of the twentieth century, the statutorification process had begun,
though it had not yet reached its present-day apogee, in which many view judicial
policymaking very skeptically.
2. Contributory vs. Comparative Negligence Under California Statutes
First-year law students are well familiar with the distinction in tort law
between contributory and comparative negligence standards. Under the
contributory negligence standard, a tort victim is barred from recovery if her own

31. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
32. We use the term “substantive provisions” to distinguish these from those provisions of the
statute that create a new administrative regime for trademarks. Those provisions of the Lanham Act are
far more detailed than are its substantive provisions and of course leave far less room for judicial
innovation or a common law approach. See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27
COLUM J.L. & ARTS 187, 198 (2004) (distinguishing the administrative provisions from substantive
ones).
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See id. at 199.
35. Id. at 198.
36. Id. (describing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)).
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negligence contributed to her harm.37 This standard reigned throughout the
common law world until the more modern comparative negligence standard
replaced it.38 Under comparative negligence, a tort victim may recover even if
her negligence contributed to her harm, but her damages are offset by the degree
to which the harm was attributable to her negligence.39 In other words, liability
is apportioned by fault. Thus, under a comparative negligence standard, a victim
who was 49% at fault for the harm she suffered can recover 51% of damages
from the tortfeasor.40
States moved from the contributory to the comparative standard at different
times, some purely through legislative means and others through the traditional
common law process.41 California’s adoption of the comparative negligence
standard is especially noteworthy. In 1872, the California legislature adopted its
Civil Code to organize and clarify the body of civil law that courts had previously
developed through the common law.42 At the time of codification, California
followed the contributory negligence standard, and California courts
subsequently held that the language of the Civil Code and its drafters’ intent was
to incorporate the common law’s contributory negligence standard then in
effect.43
However, in the 1975 case Li v. Yellow Cab, the California Supreme Court
reversed itself and adopted a pure comparative negligence standard,
notwithstanding the Civil Code’s incorporation of the contributory negligence
standard and the subsequent decades of precedent that affirmed it.44 The court
frankly acknowledged its reversal and addressed the oddity of judicial
policymaking where the legislature had already spoken.45 However, the court

37. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 12:3 (2017) (“[I]f the plaintiff can be said to have been at
fault in any degree, the plaintiff will be held to be barred of recovery regardless of the fact that the
defendant was responsible in a greater degree.”).
38. Id. § 13:3 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of states have replaced the common-law
contributory negligence rule by true comparative fault rules.”).
39. Id. § 13:7 (“All comparative fault systems in operation in the United States today involve
some method of dividing damages between the plaintiff and defendant when the plaintiff has been
contributorily negligent.”).
40. There are different operative versions of the comparative negligence standard in different
jurisdictions. See generally id. (describing the “pure” version of comparative fault, under which a
plaintiff can recover no matter his amount of fault, and the different systems of “modified” comparative
fault).
41. See id. § 13:3 (stating that the overwhelming majority of states have adopted comparative
fault through either judicial fiat or by statute).
42. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1233–34 (1975) (noting that “popular knowledge
of basic legal concepts comported well with the individualistic attitudes of the early west”).
43. See Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.—A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the
California Civil Code, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1977) (discussing the harsh contributory negligence rule in
place in 1872).
44. See Li, 532 P.2d at 1235 (ruling for the plaintiff in a case where the court was asked “to
brush aside all of the misguided decisions which have concluded otherwise up to the present day”).
45. See id. at 1233 (noting the superficial appeal of the argument that any change must come
from the legislature).
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reasoned that the legislature had not intended to strip the courts of continued
policymaking powers, and the court considered the question using the traditional
tools of the common law process: considering fairness, policy interests, and the
relevant legal trends among sister states.46
In other words, the California Supreme Court treated the statute—or at least
this provision—as a common law statute. And the court did so for good reason:
The legislature drafted the provision in broad enough terms to allow for a
comparative negligence reading; the legislature intended or understood that
courts could continue to update the law; and the statute dates from the nineteenth
century, before the obsessive—and arguably justified—movement against
judicial policymaking came into vogue.
For reasons we can only speculate, the court in Li did not explicitly refer to
the Civil Code as a whole or this particular provision as a common law statute.
Reading Li through this lens, however, is the only way to justify the court’s
policymaking role. If the court in Li is to be criticized, it is because it got the
substantive policy analysis wrong or because the provision in question cannot
reasonably be read as a common law provision. But to argue that the court did
not in fact read it in this way is to fail to engage in the court’s analysis on its own
(albeit unstated) terms.47 Accordingly, Li’s holding underscores that officially
affixing the label “common law statute” is of little importance. What matters is
that the statute has a claim to being a common law statute and that the court in
fact treated it in this manner.
D. Section 1983 is a Common Law Statute
Section 1983 fits each of the characteristics of common law statutes to a T.
It is written broadly; it is built on a rich common law tradition; and it is of the
right vintage, having been enacted in 1871.
The substance of § 1983 provides, in toto:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

46. Id. at 1239–44 (discussing several reasons for adopting a comparative negligence regime
after determining that the legislature intended to leave the statute open to further judicial development).
47. See Marion W. Benfield Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1405, 1443–44, 1444 n.145 (1994) (using California courts’ willingness to change the California
Code’s rules as an example of treating statutes as if they are common law statutes and citing the
discussion of Li in Grant Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 VT. L. REV. 233, 242–44 (1979),
to illustrate the point).
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First, this language is nothing if not “sweeping,” “general,” and “broad.”
None of the relevant terms—”color of any statute,” “Constitution and laws,”
“proper proceeding,” and more—are defined. Moreover, what shall violators be
“liable” for? What damages are available and appropriate? And what defenses
are available to defendants? All of these gaps are left for courts to fill.48 Further,
there is little guidance in the legislative history as to what these terms mean
because little of the recorded history focuses on this provision at all.49
Second, § 1983 quite clearly builds on a prior body of common law. It is
essentially a tort statute. It creates a new class of possible defendants who are
subject to suits for damages and thereby incorporates by reference that most
prototypical body of common law: tort law. Indeed, to an even greater degree
than the Sherman Act, it makes sense that § 1983 would delegate lawmaking to
the courts, just as courts have done all along in the torts arena. After all, while §
1983 creates a new kind of substantive right (the right to damages from
government actors), it simply throws open the courthouse doors for a new set of
cases that parallel the old kinds of cases that courts have always handled through
the common law process. Why would anyone think that the statute’s few words
served to adopt and reify the corpus of tort law as it stood in 1871 with respect
to this new category of defendants, while the rest of tort law continued to develop
in the common law fashion?
Third, the statute is old. It is a product of the nineteenth century, fitting
neatly into the age of common law statutes. Frankly, it is difficult to see why its
drafters would have intended, understood, or expected the operation of § 1983
to be meaningfully different from that of the Sherman Act and other common
law statutes.
The timeframe in which § 1983’s language was initially enacted is
especially telling on this point. At that time—long before Erie v. Tompkins
purported to do away with the concept of federal common law50—the operative
principle was that a federal common law developed by federal courts, separate
from the common law of each individual state, did exist.51 Against this
background and only five years prior to the enactment of § 1983, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which included a provision now codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (a). This section provides, in relevant part, that in the event
federal law is “deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies, . . . the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such . . . cause is
48. Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1052 (“[T]he statute itself tells us almost nothing about the exact
contours of liability, damages, defenses, and so forth; the legislative history closes only a few of the
gaps.”).
49. Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory
Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 65–68 (1986) (discussing the dearth of
legislative history surrounding what became § 1983).
50. See 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938).
51. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1842).
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held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause.”52 Professor Seth Kreimer has persuasively argued that
this language, though hardly a model of clarity,53 is meant to direct courts to
continue fill in the gaps in civil rights legislation by applying and continuing to
develop the corpus of federal common law, with modifications and within
limitations imposed by state statutes and constitutions.54 That is, where those
state statutes and constitutions are silent, the federal courts are to develop federal
common law to fill the gaps.
This suggests two critical points about the nature of § 1983, enacted shortly
after and within the same general context of § 1988: (1) Congress understood at
the time that federal courts regularly engaged in common law lawmaking, and
(2) it had already instructed federal courts to apply this common law method to
any civil rights legislation.55 In other words, Congress well understood what the
common law method was and in fact meant to extend this common law method
to legislation like § 1983. Thus, a civil rights statute enacted during this period
must reasonably be understood as a common law statute because Congress at the
time in fact said so. It is true that the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted
this view, favoring instead the rhetoric cited by Baude and discussed in Part II.
But the point here is that § 1983 should be understood as a common law statute,
regardless of whether the Court has done so.
Given these characteristics, it is no surprise that scholars have long taken it
as obvious that § 1983 qualifies as a common law statute. For example, Bill
Eskridge—among the leading scholars of statutory interpretation of the
generation—has identified it as the best example of a common law statute.56 Cass
Sunstein wrote that because § 1983 “is silent on many important questions,
including available defenses, burdens of pleading and persuasion, and
exhaustion requirements[,] . . . the statute delegates power to make common
law,” implicitly identifying it as a common law statute.57 According to Jack
Beermann, courts must “look to common law principles, found in the general
provisions of Reconstruction-era and current common law, along with textual
and policy analysis, to fill in the details of civil rights actions.”58 He further
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
53. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section
1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 615 (1985) (noting that “[t]he tortuous syntax of the statute, read in light
of its opaque legislative history, leaves substantial room for interpretation.”)
54. See id. at 628–33.
55. See Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-Mandated Approach
to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV. 665, 667-–68 (1986).
56. Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1052 (“The Section 1983 cases illustrate this precept [i.e., the
operation of common law statutes] best.”).
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
421–22 (1989).
58. Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 695, 700 (1997) (emphasis added).
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explains that the Court has theorized that “the enacting Congress did not intend
to freeze the evolution of the civil rights actions and require federal courts to
perpetuate outdated, abandoned, common law doctrines.”59 Justice Stevens
appears to have also conceived of § 1983 in this manner, having compared it to
the Sherman Act.60
In considering possible objections to his argument, Professor Baude briefly
touches on our argument, writing that “[m]aybe Section 1983 could be
reconceived as a common-law statute analogous to the Sherman Antitrust Act.”61
Unfortunately, he dismisses the objection in a single sentence: “The Court has
so far denied a similar kind of adapting role in creating immunities under Section
1983.”62 As we show in the next section, this defense is mistaken on its own
terms, for the Court does indeed treat § 1983, including the creation of
immunities, as a matter for common law-like development. But it is also beside
the point because it mistakenly responds to a normative argument (§ 1983 is a
common law statute) with a descriptive claim (the Court has not recognized it as
a common law statute). Even if the descriptive claim is correct, it misses the
normative objection entirely.
Baude is likely correct that the Court has never explicitly referred to § 1983
as a common law statute. But that hardly means that it is not one. For the reasons
we have just laid out, § 1983 shares all the qualities of a common law statute and
therefore should be interpreted as one—just as leading scholars have long
assumed. In short, it looks like a common law statute, walks like a common law
statute, and quacks like a common law statute. What other conclusion is there to
draw?
II.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE COURT SAYS AND WHAT IT DOES: THE
SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS TREATED § 1983 AS A COMMON LAW STATUTE
Section 1983 was enacted shortly after the Civil War. Its general purpose
was to enforce the recently-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. The occasion for its
enactment was the rise of violent Southern resistance to Reconstruction,
especially by the Ku Klux Klan, and the passivity of local officials in quelling
Ku Klux Klan terrorism. The text of § 1983 does not address many of the issues
raised in § 1983 litigation.63 Nor does the legislative history, which is mainly

59. Id. at 701. Indeed, Beermann has written extensively on the Court’s treatment of and
justifications for reading §1983 as a common law statute. See generally Jack M. Beermann, A Critical
Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989).
60. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
61. Baude, supra note 1, at 78.
62. Id.
63. For a rare instance in which the Court relied, in part, on the text in resolving a § 1893 issue,
see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978) (rejecting
respondeat superior liability for governments on the ground that the statutory language “shall subject, or
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concerned with documenting the problems that justified Congressional
intervention.64 Still, the Court has resisted the view that it fills in the large gaps
in the statute by making federal common law rules. The Court has repeatedly
insisted that its task is to interpret the statute.65 Since answers can rarely be found
in the text, structure, and legislative history, the Court looks instead to 1871
common law doctrine, especially tort law.66
In Monroe v. Pape,67 the first § 1983 case of the modern era, the Court said
that the statute “should be read against the background of tort liability that makes
a man responsible for the natural consequences of his acts.”68 In Monroe, the
Court did not specify which common law epoch to use.
But, following the logic of statutory interpretation, the Court has sometimes
chosen common law from the year 1871. Thus, “[o]ne important assumption
underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that members of the 42nd
Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses
previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended
these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the
contrary.”69 On its face, this assumption seems to justify Baude’s view that the
doctrine on qualified immunity, to the extent it departs from 1871 law, is
“inconsistent with conventional principles of statutory interpretation.”70
In this part of the article we show that the “conventional statutory
interpretation” approach to § 1983 does not fit the Court’s actual practice.
Professor Baude is misled by the Court’s rhetoric, which is better viewed as
window dressing for results reached on policy grounds. Despite its frequent
insistence that it merely interprets the statute, and despite its references to
nineteenth century tort law, the Court does not ordinarily adjudicate § 1983
cause to be subjected,” in the context of the statute, “cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously
on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a
tortfeasor.”).
64. On occasion the Court does resolve issues by reference to legislative history. See, e.g., Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding that plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative
remedies); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 64–89 (1978) (ruling that
local governments may be sued under the statute); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–87 (1961)
(finding that officers act “under color of” state law even when state law does not authorize their conduct).
65. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,
920 (1984); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997);
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–33 (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258–59
(1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255–56 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–56 (1967).
66. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION
160–61 (3rd ed. 2013) (noting the “relentless historicity of § 1983 opinions”).
67. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
68. 365 U.S. at 187.
69. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
330 (1983) (quoting Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981))). See also Pulliam v. Allen,
466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984) (“The starting point in our own analysis is the common law.”); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967) (quoting Monroe’s “background of tort liability” as the basis for recognizing
qualified immunity for police officers).
70. Baude, supra note 1.
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issues by applying conventional principles of statutory interpretation of the kind
Baude favors. In particular, it does not allow nineteenth century tort law to
control its decisions.71 Because hard questions are invariably decided based on
modern constitutional tort policy, the Court’s dominant approach is virtually the
opposite of its rhetoric. It usually makes federal common law rules, though it
never refers to “federal common law” in the opinions. The discussion of these
points is divided into two sections. Some of the cases cite 1871 tort law and
others do not. Section A discusses the former set, and section B the latter.
A. Areas in Which the Court Cites 1871 Tort Law
In some opinions the Court claims that it is bound by 1871 tort law, and it
sometimes cites nineteenth century case law. It does not ever use the vocabulary
of “federal common law” as authority for its decisions. Nonetheless, its holdings
and the rationales that actually decide cases are more convincingly explained as
federal common law than statutory interpretation. Several Supreme Court
opinions on § 1983 issues begin the analysis with a denial that the Court makes
law in this area. For example, in Tower v. Glover the Court asserted that “[w]e
do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests
of what we judge to be sound public policy.”72 In Owen v. City of
Independence,73 the Court said that “the question of the scope of a municipality’s
immunity from liability under § 1983 is essentially one of statutory
construction.”74 Tenney v. Brandhove75 derived absolute legislative immunity
from pre-nineteenth century British practice. And Stump v. Sparkman76 justified
absolute judicial immunity by citing Bradley v. Fisher,77 an absolute immunity
case decided in 1872, just one year after the statute was enacted.
1. Absolute Immunity
But there is a difference between what the Court says in some of its
opinions and the reasons that do the work of resolving most of the hard questions.
Cases in which the Court delves into 1871 tort law typically include a discussion
of modern tort policy as well. Absolute immunity furnishes the strongest cases
for Baude’s view. In Tenney v. Brandhove, for example, several centuries of
history support the proposition that the 1871 Congress acted against a

71. See JEFFRIES, ET AL., supra note 66, at 161 (“Often the policy justifications for deciding an
issue one way or the other are slighted or ignored or refracted through the historical prism of what the
framers ‘must have thought.’ As a result, students of § 1983 are often left to uncover the underlying
policies for themselves and to reach their own conclusions on the wisdom of the Court’s judgments
substantially unaided by judicial explication.”).
72. 467 U.S. 914, 922–23 (1984).
73. 445 U.S. 622, (III) (1980).
74. 445 U.S. at 635.
75. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
76. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
77. 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1872).
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background of absolute legislative immunity, such that Baude’s rule of statutory
interpretation would justify applying that rule.78 In Bogan v. Scott-Harris,79 the
Court took the same approach to local legislator immunity. It found that “[t]he
common law at the time § 1983 was enacted deemed local legislators to be
absolutely immune for their legislative activities.”80 Judicial immunity also
provides some support for Baude’s thesis. Bradley v. Fischer,81 decided just one
year after enactment of § 1983, is the most prominent nineteenth century case
holding that judges are absolutely immune from civil liability in certain
circumstances. The judge would be liable only for actions in “clear absence of
all jurisdiction.”82 Relying on Bradley, the Court ruled in Stump v. Sparkman
that judges would not be liable just because an action was taken “in error, or was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.”83
Apart from these basic rules for legislative and judicial immunity,84 the rest
of the Court’s absolute immunity cases are to one extent or another at odds with
Baude’s thesis. Consider, for example, Imbler v. Pachtman,85 the Court’s leading
case on absolute prosecutorial immunity. Baude seems to think that Imbler helps
him. He sets out a quotation from Filarsky v. Delia, in which the Court
characterizes Imbler as a historically-based ruling.86 But that characterization
does not withstand scrutiny. In Imbler, the Court examined the common law and
found that “[t]he common law immunity of a prosecutor is based on the same
considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand
jurors,”87 but it did not look to 1871 common law. Indeed, the earliest
prosecutorial immunity case was Griffith v. Slinkard,88 decided in 1896. Griffith
illustrated a longstanding common law rule, but it simply cannot count as
evidence of the background against which the 1871 Congress enacted § 1983.
Instead, “the Court in Imbler drew guidance both from the first American cases
addressing the availability of malicious prosecution actions against public
prosecutors and, perhaps more importantly, from the policy considerations
underlying the firmly established common-law rules providing absolute
immunity for judges and jurors.”89
78. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–76 (1951).
79. 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
80. 523 U.S. at 49.
81. 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
82. 80 U.S. at 351.
83. 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
84. Even in the judicial immunity context, the Court has not remained faithful to 1871. See
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that judges are not absolutely immune from injunctive
relief, despite the absence of injunctive relief against judges in nineteenth century practice).
85. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
86. See Baude, supra note 1, at 54.
87. 424 U.S. at 422–23.
88. 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896). In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976), the
Court’s first “§ 1983 absolute immunity for prosecutors” case, it cited Griffith and described it as “[t]he
first American case to address the prosecutor’s amenability to suit.”
89. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 n. 11 (1997).
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Imbler did not stress history, even post-1871 history.90 It emphasized that
the decisive factors are the policies that support immunity. Prosecutorial
immunity was justified because “the same considerations of public policy that
underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance immunity under § 1983.”
Thus, the Imbler opinion was largely concerned with policies. These included
first, the danger that the threat of suits for damages would unduly influence the
prosecutor, and second, the concern that to ward off such suits, appellate courts
may be reluctant to find errors in the prosecutor’s conduct of the criminal trial.
That reluctance would affect appellate review of prosecutorial decisions.91
The Court in Imbler understood that it would be unwise to put too much
weight on history in justifying absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court
recognized that, on the prosecutorial immunity issue, it was not appropriate to
treat 1896 and 1871 as part of the same era, such that an 1896 case can serve as
evidence of 1871 tort law.92 In 1871, “it was common for criminal cases to be
prosecuted by private parties.”93 That practice changed over time, a development
that helps explain the absolute immunity holding in Griffith.94 By the logic of
Baude’s principle that 1871 tort law controls immunity, this nineteenth century
development would call for rejection of absolute immunity for prosecutors. It
may be true that, as a matter of policy, “the same considerations that underlie the
common-law immunities of judges apply to prosecutors” so that common law
reasoning would justify the extension. But Baude’s “law of interpretation”
rejects that kind of common law reasoning. Under his rules, immunity is fixed at
1871. The 42nd Congress, acting in1871, simply would not have equated
prosecutors with judges.
2. The Functional Approach
Baude’s static approach to statutory interpretation not only looks to 1871
to determine which officials may assert immunity but also implies that the set of
activities for which absolute immunity is available would likewise depend on
1871 law. The Court’s practice is otherwise. In determining the scope of judicial
and prosecutorial immunity, the Court has not looked to 1871. Rather than
examining history, it has adopted a policy-based “functional” approach to
determine the scope of absolute immunity. For example, in Forrester v. White95
part of the defendant-judge’s job was to supervise probation officers. The judge
was sued for demoting and dismissing a probation officer on account of her
gender. The issue was whether he could assert absolute immunity in that context.
90. On at least one occasion the Court virtually ignored history, even as window dressing, in
ruling on prosecutorial immunity. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (holding that
prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability based on their lax supervision of subordinates).
91. 424 U.S. at (III B).
92. See 424 U.S. at 421, 423–29.
93. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. at 1503. See also Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 1662–65.
94. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. at 1504.
95. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
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The Court did not look to history for an answer to this question. It applied what
it calls a “functional approach,” under which the judge would receive immunity
only for judicial functions and not for administrative functions. Managing
underlings was an administrative function, not a judicial one.96 The rationale for
focusing on function was that the underlying policy behind all official immunity
was avoiding “perverse incentives,”97 and that policy was strong enough to
justify absolute immunity only when judges engaged in adjudication and closelyrelated activities. Thus, “[if] judges were personally liable for erroneous
decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits . . . would provide powerful incentives
for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits,” which
would “manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.”98 By
contrast, when judges made employment decisions, the incentive was no
different from that of “other public officials who hire and fire subordinates.”99
The Supreme Court’s modern judicial immunity cases often turn on the
resolution of this policy issue.100
Besides applying the functional approach to judging, the Court uses it to
distinguish those activities of prosecutors that fall into the absolute immunity
category, such as bringing prosecutions, conducting prosecutions,101 and training
staff,102 from those that do not, such as advising police officers103 and talking to
the media.104 In Van de Camp v. Goldstein,105 for example, the Court held that
absolute immunity applied to the function of training and supervising staff
prosecutors without once referring to 1871 or any other historical materials.
Concurring in Kalina v. Fletcher,106 Justice Scalia acknowledged the gap
between the “statutory interpretation via 1871 tort law” approach and the
functional approach: “I write separately because it would be a shame if our
opinions did not reflect the awareness that our ‘functional’ approach to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 immunity questions has produced some curious inversions of the

96. See 484 U.S. at 229.
97. 484 U.S. at 223.
98. 484 U.S. at 226–27.
99. 484 U.S. at 229–30.
100. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (holding that a judge’s act in directing police officers
to bring a lawyer into the courtroom is a judicial function because “it is a function normally performed
by a judge and [the parties] dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity”); Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers’ Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (holding that promulgation of a bar disciplinary code is a
legislative, not judicial function, and enforcement of the code is a prosecutorial, not a judicial function).
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 n. 12 (1978) is closer to the Bradley fact pattern (holding that a
judge did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction when he ordered the sterilization of a fifteen-year-old
girl without her knowledge in an ex parte proceeding).
101. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
102. Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009).
103. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1901).
104. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1992).
105. 555 U.S. 335 (2009).
106. 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
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common law as it existed in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted.”107 Thus, Kalina
held that a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity under the functional
approach for testifying to facts in support of a search warrant, even though “the
common law . . . recognized an absolute immunity for statements made in the
course of a judicial proceeding and relevant to the matter being tried.”108 The
Court’s functional approach turns out to be the opposite of Baude’s thesis. Under
the logic of Baude’s approach, the “law of interpretation” requires deference to
1871 tort law. It appears that the functional approach to absolute immunity is as
“unlawful” as he claims qualified immunity to be.
In addition to injecting modern policy into absolute immunity cases
involving prosecutors and judges, the Supreme Court takes the logic of the
functional approach a step further. If judges and prosecutors may assert absolute
immunity for judicial and prosecutorial functions, then other officers, such a
social workers, may assert “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-prosecutorial” immunity
for judicial or prosecutorial acts.109 In Cleavinger v, Saxner,110 for example, the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether prison officials were entitled to
absolute immunity when they serve on disciplinary boards. The Court introduced
its discussion of the issue with a summary of its approach:
The Court has said that in general our cases have followed a functional
approach to immunity law. Our cases clearly indicate that immunity
analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant.
Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or location within the
Government, but from the responsibilities of the individual official.111
The Court went on to hold that the prison officials sued in Cleavinger did not
have absolute immunity, but only because they “were under obvious pressure to
resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow
employee. It is the old situational problem of the relationship between the keeper
and the kept, a relationship that hardly is conducive to a truly adjudicatory
performance.”112
This reasoning did not at all imply that hearing officers will never receive
absolute immunity. On the contrary, a lower court case later followed the Court’s
reasoning and held that members of a disciplinary committee were entitled to
absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The difference from Cleavinger was that here
the committee was composed of hearing officers with independence from prison
supervisors.113

107.
108.
109.

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131–32 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
52 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring,)
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511–16 (1978); S. NAHMOD, ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 429–30, 444–45 (2015).
110. 474 U.S. 193, 201–08 (1985).
111. 474 U.S. at 201–02 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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3. The Convenient Congruence Between History and Modern
Constitutional Tort Policy
Professor Baude cites Filarsky v. Delia114 in support of his view, or at least
for “gestur[ing] at the argument.”115 The issue there was whether a private
lawyer, hired by a local government on a part-time basis to undertake an
investigation of official wrongdoing, could assert official immunity against
liability for constitutional violations he committed during the investigation. The
Court examined nineteenth century tort law and found that private actors were
often granted immunity in similar circumstances.116 Baude characterizes the
“Court’s references to common law” as “concrete and historically fixed.”117
Taken in isolation, they could be read that way. But when the opinion is taken as
a whole, it is (at best) only a “gesture” toward Baude’s view. The Court prefaced
the nineteenth century tort discussion with “[u]nder our precedent, the inquiry
begins with the common law as it existed when Congress passed 1983 in
1871.”118 Under Baude’s approach, 1871 law is both the beginning and the end.
119
For the Court, the common law, 1871 or modern, is only the beginning.120
Thus, the Court went on to consider modern tort policy, in particular the
“government interest in avoiding ‘unwarranted timidity’ on the part of those
engaged in the public’s business,”121 which is “the most important special

114. 132 S.Ct. 1657 (2012).
115. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? manuscript at 9 (on file with authors).
116. 132 S.Ct. at 1662–65.
117. Baude, supra note 1, at 54.
118. 132 S.Ct. at 1662.
119. Baude asserts that the Court has “disavowed” reliance on modern common law principles.
Baude, supra note 1, at 54.
120. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 920–21 (2017) (noting that “[c]ommon-law
principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims”); Rehberg v. Paulk,
132 S.Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (noting that “the Court’s functional approach is tied to the common law’s
identification of functions meriting the protection of absolute immunity, but the Court’s precedents have
not mechanically duplicated the precise scope of the absolute immunity the common law provided to
protect those functions.”); Kalina v. Fletcher 522 U.S. 118, 124 n.11 (1997) (noting that though there
was no absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1871, “the Court in Imbler drew guidance both from the first
American cases addressing the availability of malicious prosecution actions against public prosecutors,
and perhaps more importantly from the policy considerations underlying the firmly established
common-law rules providing absolute immunity for judges and juries”); Richardson v. McKnight, 521
U.S. 399, 404 (1997) (noting that “look[ing] both to history and to the purposes that underlie government
employee immunity in order to find the answer [to whether employees of a private prison management
firm should receive qualified immunity]”); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (noting that “the
precise contours of official immunity need not mirror the immunity at common law”) (citation and
quotation marks omitted); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts 453 U.S. 247, 258–59 (1981) (noting that
“[o]nly after careful inquiry into considerations of both history and policy has the Court construed §
1983 to incorporate a particular defense”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978) (noting that
sometimes common law damages rules will suffice for constitutional torts, but “the interests protected
by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of the common
law . . . In those cases the task will be the harder one of adapting common-law rules of damages to
provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.”).
121. 132 S.Ct. at 1665.

62

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9:41

government immunity-producing concern.”122 The Court found, as it generally
does, that “[n]othing about the reasons we have given for recognizing immunity
under § 1983 counsels against carrying forward the common law rule.”123
Filarsky is a typical case. There does not appear to be a single opinion in
which the Court has found a conflict between 1871 tort doctrine and modern
policy, and yet the Court concluded that 1871 tort doctrine should control the
outcome. Consequently, it is not clear that 1871 tort law does any of the work of
deciding cases, and it certainly does not do all of that work. On occasion, the
Court simply applied the functional approach without discussing potential
conflicts between 1871 doctrine and the functional approach.124 But the Court
has sometimes addressed the need to make a choice and has chosen function over
history. In the prosecutorial immunity cases, for example, “the Court’s
precedents have not mechanically duplicated the precise scope of the absolute
immunity that the common law provided to protect those functions.”125 The same
theme surfaces in its cases on absolute witness immunity. In Bricoe v. LaHue,126
the Court cited history to support the proposition that trial witnesses, including
police officers, are entitled to absolute immunity from defamation. The Briscoe
opinion, like many others,127 gives the impression that history determined the
outcome. In a later case, however, the Court acknowledged that Briscoe took a
step beyond 1871 doctrine. It held that “the immunity of a trial witness is
broader: In such a case, a trial witness has immunity with respect to any claim
based on the witness’ testimony.”128 After Briscoe, the next question was
whether a “complaining witness” before a grand jury would get the same
immunity. The Court faced that question in Rehberg v. Paulk.129 Citing Briscoe
and the prosecutorial immunity cases, but without identifying any historical
antecedents, the Court held that “[t]he factors that justify absolute immunity for
trial witnesses apply with equal force to grand jury witnesses.”130 It is the policy,
not the history, that drives the outcome. In Briscoe and Rehberg, the relevant
policy was the need to avoid “unwarranted timidity,” which was “the most
important special government immunity-producing concern.”131
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B. Areas in Which the Court Does Not Cite 1871 Tort Law
The cases in section A suggest that 1871 tort law is relevant to some § 1983
issues, though it is rarely determinative. By emphasizing the Court’s 1871
rhetoric in a few cases and minimizing the gap between that rhetoric and the
Court’s actions, Baude allows a small tail to wag a big dog. The minor role
played by 1871 tort law is evident in the light of the whole body of § 1983
doctrine. While the Court does sometimes refer to 1871 doctrine, especially in
absolute immunity cases, it rarely does so in the context of qualified immunity.
This doctrine is not only the target of Baude’s article but is also a far more
important defense in practice because it is available to officers generally, even
when they do not engage in a judicial, prosecutorial, or legislative function.
Equally important, the Court does not consistently refer to 1871 tort law in
resolving a range of miscellaneous issues, such as issue and claim preclusion,
release-dismissal agreements, and deference to pending state proceedings.
1. Qualified Immunity
At one point in his article, Baude seems to argue that Pierson v. Ray132
provides support for his thesis, though he later makes it clear that he disapproves
of Pierson.133 In Pierson, the Supreme Court’s first official immunity case after
Monroe, the Court held that police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for
an arrest that violates the Fourth Amendment, so long as they act with “good
faith and with probable cause.”134 The Court relied on both the common law and
policy. On the policy side, it said that “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that
he must choose between charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest
when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”135 On
the tort front, the Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts from 1965, the
Harper and James treatise on “The Law of Torts” from 1956, and an Eighth
Circuit case from 1950. Whatever the law may have been in 1871, the Court
manifestly did not rely on 1871 law. It relied on modern tort law.
In the fifteen years after Pierson, the Court decided several more qualified
immunity cases, in which it relied on both policy and common law tort
principles, without reference to 1871. Baude criticizes these later cases for
deviating from Pierson by expanding immunity beyond Pierson when they only
deviate from Baude’s approach to interpretation. The next important qualified
immunity case after Pierson is Scheuer v. Rhodes.136 Here the governor of

132. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
133. Compare Baude, supra note 1, at 52–53 (suggesting that the Court paid attention to history
in Pierson but strayed from the true path in later cases) with Baude, supra note 1, at 59 (finding fault
with Pierson on the ground that in 1871 good faith was not a defense but instead “an element of specific
torts.”)
134. 386 U.S. at 557.
135. 386 U.S. at 555.
136. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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Illinois and other officials were sued for ordering National Guard troops to shoot
at students at a protest against the Vietnam War. As in Pierson, the Court
discussed both history and policy. The difference between the two cases is that
the Court moved from the narrow focus on the common law defenses for the
police in Pierson to a more general history of official immunity going back to
17th century England137 and a more abstract statement of the policy in Schueuer.
Instead of the specific concern with shielding a police officer from an “unhappy”
fate, the Court generalized the policy behind immunity:
Although the development of the general concept of immunity, and the
mutations which the underlying rationale has undergone in its
application to various positions are not matters of immediate concern
here, it is important to note . . . that one policy consideration seems to
pervade the analysis: the public interest requires decisions and action to
enforce laws for the protection of the public.138
The Court also recognized that this pro-immunity policy had to be balanced
against the remedial goal of § 1983.139 It concluded that “a qualified immunity
is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all
the circumstances.”140 The immunity is available if the officer has “reasonable
grounds for the belief . . . coupled with good faith belief.” A year later in Wood
v. Strickland,141 the Court ruled that school board members could assert qualified
immunity. It relied on “[c]ommon law tradition . . . and strong public policy
reasons”142 and described the immunity as having both an “objective” and a
“subjective” component.143 Although common law tradition influenced Scheuer
and Wood, the Court made no effort in either case to link the immunity to 1871
tort law.
A few years later the Court faced the qualified immunity question in the
context of a suit brought under the Bivens doctrine, which allows damages suits
against federal officials for violations of constitutional rights.144 Unlike § 1983,
this federal common law doctrine does not stem from a federal statute, so its
contours do not depend at all on legislative intent. In Butz v. Economou,145 the
issue was whether the Secretary of Agriculture could assert official immunity.
The Court rejected absolute immunity but recognized the same qualified
immunity for federal executive officers as that available to state officers in §
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1983 suits. Thus, the Court examined Pierson, Scheuer, and Wood, among other
§ 1983 cases, with an emphasis on the policies behind the immunity:
the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer . . . who is required to exercise discretion,” and “the
danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to
executive his office with the decisiveness and judgment required by the
public good.”146
These policies led the Court to hold that “there is no basis for according to federal
officials a higher degree of immunity when sued for a constitutional infringement
as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the
identical violation under § 1983.”147 Pierson, Scheuer, Wood, and Butz illustrate
the interaction between policy considerations and common law tort doctrine in
the Court’s development of the qualified immunity defense. But none of them
rely on a conventional exercise of statutory interpretation, under which the 1871
tort law familiar to the Congress that enacted the statute would be key.
If any doubt remained as to the Court’s methodology, it was dispelled by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,148 the leading case on the current qualified immunity rule.
In Harlow, the Court adopted a rule that officials are immune unless they violate
“clearly established” law. That rule appears to have no common law analogue,
and the Court did not suggest otherwise. It relied entirely on tort policy, in
particular the “avoiding unwarranted timidity” policy.149 In fact, Harlow was not
even a § 1983 case. It was a suit against federal officers under an “implied cause
of action.” Paying no respect at all to the “statutory interpretation” approach to
§ 1983, the Court ruled that the policy-based Harlow rule would apply to § 1983
cases as well. Harlow is typical of qualified immunity cases. Though they
sometimes refer to modern common law principles, none of them give any
weight at all to 1871 tort law.
In Anderson v. Creighton,150 the Court confirmed that modern tort policy
would govern qualified immunity. This case involved police entry into plaintiffs’
home without a warrant to look for a fugitive. The plaintiffs claimed that the
Fourth Amendment right against such a search was clearly established because
“officers conducting such searches were strictly liable at English common law if
the fugitive was not present.” Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the right was clearly established, such that qualified
immunity would not be available to the officers. The argument failed because:
[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official
immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane
rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by Harlow,
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where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along
principles not at all embodied in the common law.151
Anderson is another Bivens case and in theory might be distinguished from the
qualified immunity issue in § 1983 litigation. But under the Court’s doctrine, that
feature is beside the point. As noted above, Harlow had already ruled that the
new rule would apply to both § 1983 and Bivens suits.
2. Other § 1983 Issues
Professor Baude’s “law of interpretation,” if valid, would apply to the
whole range of § 1983 issues. Yet he concentrates entirely on official immunity
and ignores other areas of § 1983 litigation. In Owen v. City of Independence,152
for example, the Court rejected any immunity for local governments. It took this
step even though local governments in 1871 were shielded from liability for their
governmental (as opposed to their proprietary) acts and from liability for their
discretionary (as opposed to their governmental) functions. Owen at least
acknowledged the 1871 doctrines before rejecting them. In most contexts, the
Court looks solely to modern law, including but not limited to tort doctrine. For
example, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,153 the
Court adopted a special rule of causation in § 1983 public employee speech
cases. The Court’s rule mandates a two-step approach. The initial burden is on
the plaintiff to show that protected speech was a substantial factor motivating the
adverse action taken against him. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to show
that the action would have been taken even if the plaintiff had not engaged in
protected speech. The Court made no reference to 1871 tort law. The rule was
based on the Court’s judgment that “[t]he constitutional principle at stake is
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than
if he had not engaged in the conduct.”154
More recently, in Manuel v. City of Joliet,155 the Court held that “the Fourth
Amendment [rather than due process] governs a claim for unlawful pretrial
detention even beyond the start of legal process.”156 In the circumstances of the
case, that holding gave rise to a narrower question, of a kind that may come up
in common law tort litigation: At what date does the claim accrue for purposes
of the running of the statute of limitations? The Court remanded that question
but provided some guidance. In particular, it made no reference to 1871 tort law.
Rather:
In defining the contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim, including
its rule of accrual, courts are to look first to the common law of torts.
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Sometimes, that review of common law will lead a court to adopt
wholesale the rules that would apply in a suit involving the most
analogous tort. But not always. Common-law principles are meant to
guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims, serving
“more as a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated
components.” In applying, selecting among, or adjusting common-law
approaches, courts must closely attend to the values and purposes of the
constitutional right at issue.157
Under this approach, modern tort doctrine is relevant to § 1983 issues, as are the
constitutional values at stake. But there is no room at all for deference to 1871
doctrine.
Other illustrations come from the whole range of § 1983 issues. In
adjudicating damages issues, the Court cited a modern damages treatise by
Fowler Harper, Fleming James, and Oscar Gray.158 With no rebuke from the
Supreme Court, lower courts treat § 1983 damages issues as a kind of federal
common law.159 They have applied modern damages principles to the whole
range of issues the Supreme Court has not addressed, such as joint liability,160
consortium,161 and fear of developing an illness in the future.162
The statute authorizes suits for violations of federal “laws” as well as the
Constitution.163 In Maine v. Thiboutot,164 the Court relied on this “plain
language,”165 and on “scanty legislative history,”166 to hold that § 1983 suits
could be brought to enforce federal statutes. A year later, however, it imposed
limits on the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes without identifying any
basis in legislative history or nineteenth century law for doing so.167 In Town of
Newton v. Rumery,168 the Court upheld “release-dismissal” agreements by which
a criminal defendant dismisses a § 1983 suit in exchange for dismissal of a
prosecution. This type of agreement was challenged on the ground that it violates
§ 1983 policy. In rejecting the challenge, the Court relied on the modern
Restatement of Contracts, without any inquiry into 1871 contract law.169 In Allen

157. Id. at 920–21 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to discuss factors related to the
accrual issue in the Fourth Amendment context without resolving the issue. See id. at 921–22.
158. See Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1986); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
159. See generally Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 1995).
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163. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
164. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
165. 448 U.S. at 6.
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v. McCurry,170 the plaintiff sued police officers for Fourth Amendment
violations. The issue was whether a § 1983 plaintiff is precluded from relitigating
a Fourth Amendment claim decided against him in an earlier criminal
proceeding. The Court applied the modern doctrine of issue preclusion to § 1983
suits, even though it recognized that the nineteenth century “mutuality of
estoppel” doctrine would produce a far less preclusive effect.171 In Younger v.
Harris,172 the issue was whether a federal court should dismiss a § 1983 suit in
which the plaintiff sought an injunction on federal constitutional grounds against
a criminal prosecution at which he could raise the federal issue. Following
Baude’s “1871 law” approach, the Court might have dismissed the case under
the traditional principle of equity that a court should not enjoin a criminal
prosecution. Instead, the Court emphasized “an even more vital consideration,
the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions,”173 which it
then deployed to extend the doctrine of deference to some civil and
administrative proceedings.174 When the target of the constitutional challenge is
a state tax scheme, the principle of comity blocks § 1983 suits for damages or
prospective relief, so long as a state law remedy is available.175 Citing no history,
the Court held that, “in order to recover damages for . . . harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been” nullified in one
way or another.176 The point of these illustrations is that they present a challenge
to Baude’s thesis: He must maintain either (a) that the Court has taken the wrong
path throughout its § 1983 doctrine or (b) that there is some special feature of
qualified immunity, which justifies the application of his approach to statutory
interpretation in qualified immunity cases even if that approach does not apply
to other issues. Baude has defended neither of these positions.
3. Congress’s Approval of the Common Law Method
Taken as a whole, § 1983 doctrine is best characterized as a body of federal
common law. The Court relies on an array of sources and methods. These include
the text of the statute, its legislative history, the broad remedial purposes of the
statute, and principles of the law of constitutional remedies. It also relies on “the
common law of torts (both modern and as of 1871), with such modification or
adaptation as might be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of the
statute.”177 The law in place in 1871 is relevant but has a comparatively minor
170. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
171. See 449 U.S. at 97.
172. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
173. Id. at 41.
174. See Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591–92 (2013).
175. See Nat. Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995) (injunctions
and declaratory judgments); Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (damages).
176. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994).
177. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).
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role. Thus, Baude’s critique of qualified immunity implies that the
“unlawfulness” of the doctrine extends far beyond that doctrine to the whole
range of § 1983 questions. But Baude’s thesis is problematic even if we accept
his premise that “the law of interpretation” governs § 1983 issues.178 Baude’s
thesis suggests that Congress is a passive victim of judicial abuse. This is not so.
In fact, Congress has evidently approved the Court’s methodology. In 1996,
Congress reenacted § 1983, adding a clause in response to a Supreme Court
ruling.179 The case was Pulliam v. Allen,180 in which the Court held that judges
may be sued for injunctive relief. Congress’s response was to add a proviso to
the authorization of equitable relief. Injunctions remain generally available,
“except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
181

Since the contours of the Court’s judge-made doctrine were firmly settled
by 1996, the reenactment of the statute with just this one modification provides
strong support for the proposition that Congress has accepted, and even
endorsed, the Court’s approach. There is solid authority for this understanding
of statutory reenactments in federal courts law. For example, long ago the Court
created an exception to federal diversity jurisdiction for divorce cases.182 A
century later, the Court upheld the exception in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,183
despite the absence of any statutory text. The Court relied on the 1948 revision
of the diversity statute.184 In that revision, Congress replaced earlier language,
which had limited federal jurisdiction to “suits of a civil nature at common law
or in equity.” The new statute omitted that phrase in favor of “all civil actions.”185
The Court explained that, although the new statute made no reference to the
Court’s domestic relations exception, the new one indicated “Congress’ apparent
acceptance of [the Court’s] construction of the diversity jurisdiction in the years
prior to 1948.”186 Just as in 1948 Congress “made substantive changes to the
[diversity] statute in other respects,” in 1996 it made a substantive change to §
178. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV . 45, 47, 47 n.5
(2018).
179. See JEFFRIES, ET AL., supra note 66, at 60–61.
180. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
181. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309, 110 Stat. 3893 (Oct.
19, 1996). Baude acknowledges the existence of this statute but does not examine its implications for
his thesis. See Baude, supra note 1, at 80, 80 n.204. This is not the sole Congressional intervention. In
1979, after the Court had laid the foundations for much of modern § 1983 doctrine, Congress had
amended the statute to provide that the District of Columbia can be sued. See Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284.
182. See Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582,
584 (1859).
183. 504 U.S. 689, 694–95 (1992).
184. 504 U.S. at 700.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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1983.187 In Ankenbrandt, the Court “presume[d], absent any indication that
Congress intended to alter [the domestic relations] exception, that Congress
adopted that interpretation when it reenacted the diversity statute.”188 The same
presumption should apply to the Court’s common law methodology in § 1983
adjudication.
CONCLUSION
There is much to criticize about the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence, including
the expansive qualified immunity doctrine it has developed.189 We share many
of Professor Baude’s apparent policy preferences, but we think his methodology
is wrong. He hopes to remake qualified immunity doctrine by convincing the
Court to effectively jettison decades of doctrine and chalking it up to a mistake.
We think there is a better way, one that is more likely to be effective and that is
truer to § 1983’s normative qualities and its history in the courts. Because § 1983
is a common law statute and has implicitly been treated as such by the Court, the
Justices themselves hold the ultimate power to reshape it. The challenge is not
to convince them that they have fatally misunderstood the common law as it
historically stood in 1871 but rather that contemporary policy considerations and
the wisdom of experience argue for doctrinal refinement. In other words, the
Justices should behave as generations of Justices always have in this area and
not turn themselves into historians.

187. See supra text following note 181.
188. 504 U.S. at 701 (citation, internal quotation marks, and internal editing omitted).
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207, 250 (2013).

